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THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, NEO-
REHABILITATIONISM, AND JUDICIAL
COLLECTIVISM: THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH
BECOMES MOST DANGEROUS
by Morris B. Hoffman*
INTRODUCTION
The movement that calls itself "therapeutic jurisprudence"' is
both ineffective and dangerous, in almost the same way that its
* District Judge, Second Judicial District (Denver), State of Colorado. The
views expressed here are of course my own, and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the District Court for the Second Judicial District or any of my colleagues on that
court. I would like to thank my law clerk, Steven J. Wienczkowski, for his invaluable
contributions to this article, both in his research and his editorial suggestions. I also
owe a debt of gratitude to Professor James L. Nolan, Jr., from whose meticulous ex-
aminations of the therapeutic jurisprudence paradigm in general, and its drug court
variant in particular, I liberally quote. Professor Nolan has become one of the leading
academics with the courage to ask whether the emperor of therapeutic jurisprudence
has any clothes.
1. The term "therapeutic jurisprudence" is generally credited to David Wexler, a
law professor at the University of Arizona, who, as discussed in the text accompany-
ing notes 88-89 infra, originally defined the term in a paper first delivered in 1987, but
not published until 1992, to mean the study of the therapeutic impacts of mental
health law. David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law: Thera-
peutic Jurisprudence, 16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 27 (1992). He and others subsequently
expanded the idea beyond the mental health realm, arguing not only that virtually all
court proceedings can have important therapeutic impacts on the participants, but
that judges should craft their decisions with an eye toward those impacts. See, e.g.,
ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (D. Wexler & B. Winnick eds., 1991);PRAC-
TICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION (D. Stolle, D.
Wexler & B. Winnick eds., 2000); THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW As THER-
APEUTIC AGENT (D. Wexler ed., 1990); David A. Wexler, New Directions in Thera-
peutic Jurisprudence: Breaking the Bounds of Conventional Mental Health Law
Scholarship, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 915 (1993). The phrase "restorative justice"
is also sometimes used to connote what appears to be a similar constellation of ideas,
though it tends to be used only in the criminal justice arena. See, e.g., John
Braithewaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, 25
CRIME & JUST. 1 (1999); Robert F. Schopp, Therapeutic Jurisprudence Forum: Inte-
grating Restorative Justice and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 67 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 665
(1998); Comment, Repairing the Breach and Reconciling the Discordant: Mediation in
Criminal Justice Systems, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1479 (1994). The phrase "collaborative law"
is also used to describe the therapeutic approach in law, especially in divorce law. See
generally Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Law: A New Paradigm for Divorce Law-
yers, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & L. 967 (1999). Finally, the phrase "problem-solving
courts" seems to be the most recent way to describe various therapeutic courts, espe-
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predecessor-the rehabilitative movement that became popular in
the 1930s and was abandoned in the 1970s-was both ineffective
and dangerous. Drug use, shoplifting, and graffiti are no more
treatable today than juvenile delinquency was treatable in the
1930s. The renewed fiction that complex human behaviors can be
dealt with as if they are simple diseases gives the judicial branch
the same kind of unchecked and ineffective powers that led to the
abandonment of the rehabilitative ideal in the 1970s. In fact, this
new strain of rehabilitationism has produced a judiciary more in-
trusive, more institutionally insensitive and therefore more danger-
ous than the critics of the rehabilitative ideal could ever have
imagined.
I. THE REAL FACE OF THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
In a drug court in Washington, D.C., the judge roams around the
courtroom like a daytime TV talk show host, complete with
microphone in hand.' Her drug treatment methods include show-
ing movies to the predominantly African-American defendants, in-
cluding a movie called White Man's Birth.3 She often begins her
drug court sessions by talking to the "clients" 4 about the movies,
and then focusing the discussion on topics like "racism, justice, and
equality."5 The judge explains her cinemagraphic approach to ju-
risprudence this way:
Obviously they need to talk about their own problems and what
leads to them, but I also think that it's good to have distractions
in life. I've found out that if there are periods of your life when
you are unhappy, sometimes going out to see an interesting
movie or going out with a friend and talking about something
else, or going to the gym to work out, these kinds of things can
help you through a bad day.6
cially so-called "community-based courts." See infra notes 117-120 and accompanying
text. One cannot help but chuckle, and think of George Orwell's insights into the
politicization of language, at a movement that describes intrusive judicial state action
of an unprecedented magnitude as "problem solving."
2. JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., REINVENTING JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT
MOVEMENT 7 (2001).
3. Id.
4. It is de rigueur for judges and their staff in therapeutic jurisprudence courts to
call parties "clients," even criminal defendants. This is not only consistent with the
whole approach of therapeutic jurisprudence-to treat rather than to adjudicate-but
is also a linguistic expression of the stunning mixing of roles between judge, prosecu-
tor, and defense lawyer. See infra notes 110-31 and accompanying text.
5. NOLAN, JR., supra note 2, at 7.
6. Id.
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After the film discussion, the session begins in earnest. Defend-
ants who are not doing well are scolded and sometimes told stories,
often apocryphal, about the fates that have befallen other uncoop-
erative defendants or the drug court judge's own friends and family
members.7 Some defendants are jailed for short periods of time
and/or regressed to stricter treatment regimens, and eventually
some are sentenced to prison.8 The audience applauds defendants
who are doing well, and the judge hands out mugs and pens to the
compliant. The judge regularly gives motivational speeches that
are part mantra and part pep rally. Here is a typical example:
Judge: Where is Mr. Stevens? Mr. Stevens is moving right along
too. Right?
Stevens: Yep.
Judge: How come? How come it is going so great?
Stevens: I made a choice.
Judge: You made a choice. Why did you do that? Why did you
make that choice? What helped you to make up your mind to
do it?
Stevens: There had to be a better way than the way I was doing
it.
Judge: What was wrong with the way you were living? What
didn't you like about it?
Stevens: It was wild.
Judge: It was wild, like too dangerous? Is that what you mean
by wild?
Stevens: Dangerous.
Judge: Too dangerous, for you personally, like a bad roller
coaster ride. So, what do you think? Is this new life boring?
Stevens: No, not at all.
Judge: Not at all. What do you like about the new life?
Stevens: I like it better than the old.
Judge: Even though the old one was wild, the wild was kind of
not a good wild. You like this way.
Stevens: I love it.
7. For a summary of the astonishing storytelling aspects of drug courts, see No-
LAN, JR., supra note 2, at 111-36.
8. For a general description of the organization, implementation, operation and
sentencing models used in drug courts, see Morris B. Hoffman, The Drug Court Scan-
dal, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1437, 1462-63 (2000). As discussed in the text accompanying
notes 31 to 32 infra, drug courts are probably sending considerably more people to
prison than traditional courts, because of a combination of net-widening and ineffec-
tive treatment.
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Judge: You love it. Well, we're glad that you love it. We're very
proud of you. In addition to your certificate, you're getting a
pen which says, "I made it to level four, almost out the door."9
This is the real face of therapeutic jurisprudence. It is not a cari-
cature. Except for the movie reviews, this Washington, D.C. drug
court is typical of the manner in which this particular kind of thera-
peutic court is operating all over the country. Defendants are "cli-
ents"; judges are a bizarre amalgam of untrained psychiatrists,
parental figures, storytellers, and confessors; sentencing decisions
are made off-the-record by a therapeutic team1" or by "community
leaders";" and court proceedings are unabashed theater.1 2 Suc-
cessful defendants-that is, defendants who demonstrate that they
can navigate the re-education process and speak the therapeutic
language13-are "graduated" from the system in festive ceremonies
that typically include graduation cake, balloons, the distribution of
mementos like pens, mugs, or T-shirts, parting speeches by the
graduates and the judge, and often the piece de rdsistance-a big
hug from the judge.'4
9. NOLAN, JR., supra note 2, at 8-9.
10. See infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text; see also Hoffman, supra note 8,
at 1524, discussing the off-the-record "staffing" ritual, at which neither the defendant
nor private defense counsel is present, yet at which presumptive sentencing decisions
are made.
11. See infra notes 117-120 and accompanying text (discussing community-based
courts).
12. Drug court proponents themselves acknowledge that drug courts are a kind of
theater, whose audience includes not only the clients to be re-educated but also skep-
tical prosecutors, media, politicians, and other influential members of the non thera-
peutic community. "Drug courts, it has been said many times, are theater. And the
judge is the stage director and one of the primary actors." NOLAN, JR., supra note 2,
at 73 (quoting Baltimore drug court judge Jamey Weitzman). Indeed, the theatrical
aspects of drug court-both as a therapeutic tool and as tightly scripted propaganda-
are a focal point of national drug court training conferences. The titles of some of
these conferences are telling: "Damage Control: Dealing with the Media," "Getting
Local Government and the Community to 'Buy In' to a Drug Court," "Dealing with
the Press/Politics." Id. at 62. See infra notes 112-113 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing particular points of propaganda spread at national conferences).
13. See infra note 25 (discussing the fact that therapeutic defendants are well
aware that their "treatment" is an attitudinal game they must pretend to play in order
to escape the clutches of the criminal justice system).
14. A Compton, California drug court judge's explanation is typical of the parent-
child model by which many therapeutic judges see their relationship to their "clients":
I let [the defendant] come into my chambers. . . . All she wanted was a
hug.... So, I just gave her a hug. I mean, what would you do if your child
came up to you, and said, "May I have a hug?" You wouldn't say, "Well, let
me think about this now. You have been bad fifteen times." You would just
do it. So, that is what I did. And yes, you should [give hugs]. You get a
whole lot back. You really do.
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Drug courts are the most visible, but by no means the only, judi-
cial expression of the therapeutic jurisprudence movement. The
idea that judges should be in the business of treating the psyches of
the people who appear before them is taking hold not only in drug
courts but in a host of other criminal and even civil settings. Some
therapeutic jurists see bad parenting, domestic violence, petty
theft, and prostitution as curable diseases, akin to drug addiction,
and argue that divorcing parents, wife-beaters, thieves, and prosti-
tutes should therefore be handled in specialized treatment-based
courts.' 5 The objects of the treatment efforts include not only the
litigants in civil cases, and the criminals and victims in criminal
cases, but also the "community" that is "injured" by the miscreant.
Petty criminals in many so-called "community-based courts" are in
effect sentenced by panels of community members, typically to
perform various community services as deemed necessary by the
panels, in order to "heal" the damage done to the "community.' 16
It is curious that the existing scope of the therapeutic jurispru-
dence movement, with the exception of drug offenses, is limited to
relatively minor petty and misdemeanor criminal offenses.1 7 We
might ask ourselves why the movement ignores the entire spectrum
of violent felonies, so many of which have an apparent psychiatric
component. We don't have specialized child molester courts in
which "clients" are hugged and pampered and cajoled into right-
thinking. Why not? My suspicion, as discussed in more detail be-
low,' 8 is that what much of therapeutic jurisprudence is really
about, at least in the criminal arena, is a de facto decriminalization
of certain minor offenses which the mavens of the movement do
not think should be punished, but which our Puritan ethos com-
mands cannot be ignored. Supporters of the movement recognize
that as a political matter they cannot go too far blurring the distinc-
tion between acts and excuses.1 9
True to their New Age pedigree, therapeutic courts are remarka-
bly anti-intellectual and often proudly so. For example, the drug
court variant is grounded on a wholly uncritical acceptance of the
disease model of addiction, a model that is extremely controversial
NOLAN, JR., supra note 2, at 102.
15. Id. at 149.
16. See infra notes 117-120 and accompanying text.
17. But see infra note 120 (discussing proposed extensions of community-based
courts).
18. See infra Part IV.D.
19. See infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
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in the medical, psychiatric, and biological communities.2" All of
the therapeutic jurisprudence variants presume that the underlying
problem in virtually all kinds of cases-drug abuse, domestic vio-
lence, delinquency, dependency, divorce, petty crimes-is low self
esteem, despite the fact that many psychological studies have
shown that violent criminals tend to have high self esteem.2
The question asked in these new therapeutic courts is not
whether the state has proved that a crime has been committed, or
whether the social contract has otherwise been breached in a fash-
ion that requires state intervention, but rather how the state can
heal the psyches of criminals, victims, families, dysfunctional civil
litigants, and the community. The goal is state-sponsored treat-
ment, not adjudication, and the adjudicative process is often seen
as an unnecessary and disruptive impediment to treatment.22 Be-
cause the very object is treatment, rehabilitated criminals deserve
no punishment beyond what is necessary to restore them, their vic-
tims, and the community to their prior state.23
20. See generally Hoffman, supra note 8, at 1469-73. Many drug court proponents
express a certain ironic pride in the fact that they believe they are much more enlight-
ened on the disease model of addiction than medical professionals:
It's amazing listening to physicians say, "It's not a disease." It's almost done
a reverse. We have people who are normally not trained in the medical field
calling it a disease and those who are trained in the medical field saying, "It's
not a disease," that it's just a lack of guts or lack of intestinal fortitude of the
individual. It's a scary thought.
NOLAN, JR., supra note 2, at 137 (quoting unnamed director of treatment at one of the
drug courts Professor Nolan visited). It is, indeed, a "scary thought," but not for the
reasons this treatment director thinks.
21. See, e.g., ANDREW MECCA ET AL., THE SOCIAL IMPORTANCE OF SELF-ESTEEM
(1989); Roy F. Baumeister et al., Relation of Threatened Egotism to Violence and Ag-
gression: The Dark Side of Self-Esteem, 5 PSYCHOL. REV. 101 (1995). See generally
JOHN P. HEWITT, THE MYTH OF SELF-ESTEEM: FINDING HAPPINESS AND SOLVING
PROBLEMS IN AMERICA (1998).
22. See, e.g., NOLAN, JR., supra note 2, at 141 (quoting Syracuse, New York drug
court judge Langston McKinney):
By volunteering in the drug court program the defendant has circumvented
[the adjudicative] part of the judicial process. . . . "(W]e literally leave all
that [judicial impartiality, presumption of innocence, etc.] at the doorstep."
In the drug court context, "this issue of guilt/innocence is not of concern."
See also infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text (discussing the drug court's eradica-
tion of the concept of guilt).
23. In one of the most telling expositions of the therapeutic paradigm, the appel-
late lawyer for Karla Faye Tucker argued that the state of Texas had no right to exe-
cute her because she was no longer the same person who had committed the multiple
murders for which the prior Ms. Tucker had been convicted. The lawyer's argument,
flush with therapeutic newspeak, was actually published in a law review after his cli-
ent's execution. Walter C. Long, Karla Faye Tucker: A Case for Restorative Justice, 27
AM. J. CRIM. L. 117 (1999). Of course, that argument is precisely the same argument
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The therapeutic jurisprudence movement is not only anti-intel-
lectual, it is wholly ineffective. The treatment is a strange combina-
tion of Freud, Alcoholics Anonymous, and Amway, whose
apparent object is not really to change behaviors so much as to
change feelings.24 Drug courts are a perfect example. The success
of drug-court treatment programs is measured more by a defen-
dant's professed attitude adjustment than by the sort of concrete
measures one might expect of such programs, such as whether the
defendant stops using drugs. As long as defendants are compliant
with treatment ("buying into the program," as addiction counselors
say), they are moved from treatment phase to treatment phase,
often irrespective of whether the treatment is actually working. As
James Nolan puts it, drug court success "is evaluated in large mea-
sure by whether or not clients adopt a particular perspective.
'2 5
The particular perspective required is the disease model of ad-
diction. Compliance is almost always measured by a defendant's
willingness to admit that his or her drug use is a disease. Any resis-
made by Bentham and the other utilitarians in the 1800s: if the only purpose of pun-
ishment is to deter the punished criminal, then no criminal may morally be punished
beyond what it takes to rehabilitate him. See infra notes 55-60 and accompanying
text. At least Bentham had the courage of his convictions, which is more than can be
said for the current devotees of therapeutic jurisprudence, who are so worried that
they will be seen as soft on crime that they would never apply their strange principles
to serious crime. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
24. In fact, I suspect that it is the improved feelings of the treaters, and not of the
treated, that is really driving judges' infatuation with therapeutic courts. The thera-
peutic jurisprudence movement in general, and the drug court movement in particu-
lar, is strewn with discussions of the positive effects therapeutic programs have on the
treaters. See supra note 14 (reporting emotional benefits the drug court judge real-
izes from hugging a defendant).
25. Id. Nolan reports a stunning example of the extent to which compliance in
therapeutic courts is measured more by what a defendant says than by what a defen-
dant does. The Oakland probation department commended a drug court defendant
for his compliance in treatment, and recommended that he be graduated from phase 2
to phase 3, even though the defendant had not had a single negative urinalysis in all of
phase 2. JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., THE THERAPEUTIC STATE: JUSTIFYING GOVERNMENT
AT CENTURY'S END 296 (1998). Defendants understand that they have to play the
treatment game to pass through the criminal hoops. Nolan reports on a particularly
embarrassing unraveling of a Washington, D.C. drug court session that was being tele-
vised live to a large convention of treatment providers. The session began in stock
theatrical form, but at one point an uncooperative defendant began to depart from
the script. When asked why his treatment program had been so difficult for him, he
said "'Cause I had to come and sit here and listen to this crap." NOLAN, JR., supra
note 2, at 69. The dam broke, and other defendants started to complain about the
therapeutic game. At one point, laughter began to break out amongst the conven-
tioneers. "When it became clear the judge was not going to be able to regain control
of the performance, conference officials just cut the video feed. 'We have to stay on
schedule,' an organizer deadpanned."' Id. at 70.
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tance to the disease model is reported as "denial," a crime appar-
ently much worse than continued drug use.26
The therapeutic jurisprudence literature is almost completely de-
void of any empirical discussion of whether litigants, defendants,
and victims, let alone "communities," are actually being helped by
all this perspective-changing treatment, and understandably so.
The imprecise words common to the therapeutic language-words
like "healed," "restored," and "cured"-are simply incapable of
being subjected to rigorous testing.
When investigators have looked at less imprecise measures of
success-like recidivism rates-the therapeutic promise has proved
wholly ineffective. 27 For example, the very first effectiveness study
performed on the very first modern drug court-in Dade County,
Florida-showed that drug defendants treated in the drug court
and drug defendants processed in the traditional courts suffered
statistically identical rearrest rates.28 Virtually every serious study
of drug court effectiveness has reached similarly sobering results,29
26. Id.; see also infra note 110 and accompanying text (discussing reverse moral
screening). Dade County Drug Court officials report that they have had particular
difficulty with the willingness of Hispanic clients to admit they have a disease and
suggest that the difficulty may somehow be attributable to a cultural resistance to the
disease model. NOLAN, JR., supra note 25, at 296.
27. The ineffectiveness of involuntary court-based therapy comes as no surprise to
people familiar with the ineffectiveness of voluntary psychotherapy in general, espe-
cially in an addiction context. Peer-reviewed controlled studies-which are scandal-
ously rare-are virtually unanimous in their conclusion that there is no evidence that
twelve-step programs produce better results than clinical treatment or even better
results than no treatment at all. See William R. Miller & Reid K. Hester, The Effec-
tiveness of Alcoholism Treatment: What Research Reveals, in TREATING ADDICTIVE
BEHAVIORS: PROCESSES OF CHANGE 121, 135-36 (W. Miller & N. Heather eds., 1986)
(reviewing all controlled studies of alcohol treatment programs, finding only two on
AA programs, and noting that both of those AA studies showed that members of AA
got arrested more often and relapsed more frequently than the control group of un-
treated problem drinkers). Even clinical treatment seems ineffective. In a famous
1983 study of the effectiveness of inpatient alcohol treatment, the ability of treated
patients to stop drinking and stay sober two years and eight years postdischarge was
no better than that of the untreated control group. GEORGE VALLIANT, THE NATU-
RAL HISTORY OF ALCOHOLISM 284-94 (1983). The data on the effectiveness of drug
treatment is no more encouraging. See, e.g., Stanton Peele, How People's Values De-
termine Whether They Become and Remain Addicts, in VISIONS OF ADDICTION 219-20
(S. Peele ed., 1988).
28. In particular, Dade County drug defendants entering the drug court program
suffered a one-year re-arrest rate of 32%, compared to Dade County drug defendants
in traditional courts, who suffered a re-arrest rate over the same period of 33%. BAR-
BARA E. SMITH ET AL., STRATEGIES FOR COURTS TO COPE WITH THE CASELOAD
PRESSURES OF DRUG CASES 7 (1991).
29. Here, for example, are the results from five major effectiveness studies done
by independent outsiders in the mid- and late-1990s:
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leading the General Accounting Office to declare in 1997 that
there is simply no firm evidence that drug courts are effective in
reducing either recidivism or relapse.30
Drug courts not only do not reduce recidivism or relapse, they
have the unintended consequence of dramatically increasing the
number of drug defendants sent to prison. The reason is massive
net-widening, that is, the phenomenon whereby new programs
targeted for a limited population end up serving much wider popu-
lations and thereby losing their effectiveness. In Denver, Colo-
rado, for example, the number of drug cases nearly tripled two
years after the implementation of its drug court.31 That fact, cou-
pled with typically dismal recidivism rates, led to the entirely pre-
dictable result that Denver judges sent more than twice the
number of drug defendants to prison in 1997, two years after the
implementation of the drug court, than they did in 1993, the last
year before the implementation of the drug court.32
If therapeutic jurisprudence were just a trendy idea that did not
work, we could let it die a natural death. But it is not just trendy
and ineffective, it is profoundly dangerous. Its very axioms depend
on the rejection of fundamental constitutional principles that have
protected us for 200 years. Those constitutional principles, based
on our founders' profound mistrust of government, and including
the commands that judges must be fiercely independent, and that
% Traditional % Drug Court
Date Drug Court Recidivism Recidivism
1996 Baltimore
District 27.1 22.6
County 30.4 26.5
1997 Denver 58 53
1994 Phoenix 48.7 33.2
1993 New York City 50.5 53.5
1994 Travis County, TX 41.0 38.0
1998 Wilmington, DE 51.0 33.3
See generally STEVEN BELENKO & TAMARA DUMANOVSKY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE As-
SISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL DRUG COURTS: PROGRAM BRIEF 2
(1993); Steven Belenko, Research on Drug Courts: A Critical Review, 1 NAT'L DRUG
CT. INST. REV. 1 (1998).
30. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DRUG COURTS: OVERVIEW OF GROWTH,
CHARACTERISTICS, AND RESULTS 7-8 (1997).
31. Hoffman, supra note 8, at 1501-02.
32. Id. at 1510-11. These exploding prison populations were not the result of a
general increase in criminal cases. On the contrary, since the Denver Drug Court
began its operations, the percentage of drug cases filed in the court has exploded.
Here are the complete figures for criminal cases with the Denver District Court from
1991 through 1998 (the drug court became operational in July 1994):
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the three branches of government remain scrupulously separate,
are being jettisoned for what we are led to believe is an entirely
new approach to punishment. In fact, this new approach-state
mandated treatment-turns out to be a strangely out-of-touch re-
turn to rehabilitative ideals that gained popularity in the 1930s, but
were abandoned in the 1970s because they not only did not work
but, in the bargain, armed the state with therapeutic powers inimi-
cal to a free society.
There are four main reasons why the new therapeutic judges are
most dangerous: 1) they are amateur therapists but have the pow-
ers of real judges; 2) they act in concert with each other, their com-
munities, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and the self-interested
therapeutic cottage industry, contrary to the fundamental principle
of judicial independence; 3) they impinge on the executive branch's
prosecutorial and correctional functions; and 4) they impinge on
the legislative function by making drug policy.
Before I address these four dangers, let me briefly review the
history of punishment and the scant theoretical underpinnings of
the therapeutic jurisprudence movement in the context of this
history.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PUNISHMENT
The idea of punishment as moral retribution may have its roots
in what some anthropologists have called "defilement," the process
by which primitive societies interpreted and explained human suf-
fering as punishment by the gods.33 Such an explanation for other-
wise inexplicable suffering can be deeply comforting. It means that
our suffering is not meaningless and, more practically, that if we
Year Criminal Cases Drug Cases % Drug Cases
1991 3,795 958 25.2
1992 3,790 1,014 26.7
1993 3,762 1,047 27.8
1994 3,907 1,260 32.2
1995 5,154 2,661 51.6
1996 5,814 3,017 51.9
1997 5,458 2,825 51.8
1998 5,089 2,585 50.8
Hoffman, supra note 8, at 1502 n.260.
33. See, e.g., PAUL RICOEUR, THE SYMBOLISM OF EVIL 26-27 (1967).
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abide by the laws of the gods we will be protected from their
wrath.34
As humans began to imitate the laws of gods with the laws of
men, we also imitated defilement. Punishment became one of the
methods by which we not only enforced our common codes of con-
duct but also comforted one another with the idea that no one
would have to endure man-inflicted suffering so long as the codes
of conduct were honored. Indeed, in its most profound sense, the
rule of law necessarily requires the tyranny of gods over man, or of
the many over the few, and that tyranny in turn requires some form
of theocratic or group disapproval when norms are violated.
Interestingly, imprisonment as a form of punishment is a rela-
tively recent invention, in contrast to custodial detention pending
trial. In the ancient world, most crimes were punished either by
banishment, various forms of corporal punishment such as beating
or mutilation, or, most often, death.36 Imprisonment was reserved
as punishment only for disobedient slaves, whose execution was
uneconomic; political criminals, whose execution risked martyr-
dom; and petty criminals, whose execution was unwarranted.37
Even as late as the 1780s, in a society as fully touched by the En-
lightenment as England, death was the sanction for virtually every
crime, including crimes that we would today deem misdemeanors.38
34. The God of the Old Testament was, of course, very much a retributionist. One
of the central issues in virtually every religion is how to explain man's discovery that
God's retribution does not always appear just.
35. A few commentators contend that the roots of punishment were in fact restor-
ative, rather than retributive, at least until the Norman Conquest. See, e.g.,
Braithewaite, supra note 1, at 2. This view stems from an overbroad, noncriminologi-
cal use of the word "punishment." It goes without saying that humans have always
recognized that some wrongdoers can change their ways, hoped that all wrongdoers
could, and suspected that some wrongdoers cannot. Naturally, these views found their
way into many human institutions, from families to churches. These views do not shed
any real light on the question of criminological punishment-that is, what the state
should do to a particular wrongdoer in response to a particular crime. Is the wrong-
doer one of us, who must be punished to restore his moral standing? See infra notes
50-52 and accompanying text. Or is he diseased, and in need of some kind of treat-
ment? In this sense, it is clear that civilization has always been retributive and not
rehabilitative, at least until the 1920s and 1930s, when the confluence of Freud and the
Progressives led us to a rehabilitative norm where all people are seen as the diseased
products of their past, and therefore fundamentally not responsible for their actions.
See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
36. NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 4 (1974).
37. Id.
38. 4 WILLIAM A. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *98
(W.L. Dean ed., 1846). In a famous passage in A Tale of Two Cities, Dickens laments
that, as late as the French Revolution, English law imposed the death sentence for all
manner of criminal offenses, including forgery, bad checks, unlawfully opening a let-
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There were many precursors to the modern prison: jails for pretrial
detention and short sentences; workhouses for debtors; almshouses
for the poor; reformatories for minors; convict ships for banish-
ment; and the gallows for most other crimes.39
In fact, the prison-that is, a jail for serving long sentences after
conviction-is a uniquely American invention. Prisons were first
used by Pennsylvania Quakers in the late 1700s, primarily as a hu-
mane alternative to corporal punishment and execution.4 0 The first
prison was Philadelphia's Walnut Street Jail, which the Quakers
opened in 1790 as a "penitentiary" for criminals convicted in the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.41 The Quaker notion of a peni-
tentiary was the product of the fortuitous confluence of the
Quakers' theological beliefs and their knowledge of Cesare Bec-
caria's retributionist monograph On Crimes and Punishment.42
The Quakers hoped that long periods of isolation, which provided
an opportunity for reflection and solitary Bible study, would ulti-
mately lead to repentance. 43 New York adopted this system in
1796, and prisons soon flourished across America and Europe.4 4
The modern debate about punishment revolves around the pri-
macy of four components: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation,
and rehabilitation. 45 In the late 1700s-precisely at the time when
the Quakers were experimenting with prisons and, more impor-
tantly, when our founders were debating our form of govern-
ment-the German philosopher Immanuel Kant constructed a
philosophy of retribution, giving a rational foundation to what had
been the retributional basis of all punishment since the dawn of
civilization.46 He argued that the preeminent goal of criminal law
must be retribution, and that punishment should be an end in it-
ter addressed to another, stealing as little as forty shillings, and horse theft. CHARLES
DICKENS, A TALE OF Two CITIES 50 (Oxford Univ. Press 1953) (1859).
39. MORRIS, supra note 36, at 4.
40. Id. at 5.
41. Id. at 5. Some historians contend that the first true penitentiary was the so-
called "People Pen" constructed by the Massachusetts Pilgrims in Boston in 1632. See,
e.g., PHILIP D. JORDAN, FRONTIER LAW AND ORDER: TEN ESSAYS 140 (1970). In any
event, it is clear that it was the Quaker's Walnut Street Jail, and not the Pilgrims'
Boston People Pen, that became the model for the early American penitentiary.
MORRIS, supra note 36, at 4-5.
42. MORRIS, supra note 36, at 5. See the discussion of Baccaria in the text accom-
panying infra notes 53-55.
43. MORRIS, supra note 36, at 4.
44. Id. at 5.
45. Id. at 58.
46. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 101 (Ladd
trans., Bobbs-Merrill 1965) (1797).
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self.47 Kant's view was that to punish the criminal defendant as a
means to any other utilitarian goal-deterrence or rehabilitation,
for example-was to de-humanize him by reducing him to an ob-
ject. 8 Moreover, Kant viewed punishment as a purely retributive
reaction to the crime itself, therefore, the punishment had to be
proportionate to the crime.49
Georg Hegel concurred with Kant's retributionist ideal, adding
the notion that punishment annulled the crime. 50 In Hegel's con-
struct, crime is the negation of moral law, and punishment is neces-
sary to negate that negation to restore the moral right.5 1 Hegel
continued the Kantian view that criminals themselves are moral
beings, entitled to have their crimes negated by proportionate pun-
ishment. As Hegel stated:
[P]unishment is regarded as containing the criminal's right and
hence by being punished he is honoured as a rational being. He
does not receive this due of honour unless the concept and mea-
sure of his punishment are derived from his own act. Still less
does he receive it if he is treated either as a harmful animal who
has to be made harmless, or with a view to deterring and re-
forming him.52
Cesare Beccaria is generally credited with the first systematic ex-
position of proportionality. 53 His version, much heralded in West-
ern Europe and the American colonies, took a decidedly political
view. Beccaria believed that requiring criminal sentences to be
proportionate to the crime was an important limitation on the pow-
ers of government.54
Thus, retribution not only survived the Enlightenment, it
achieved an important philosophical structure, both in its own right
and as the basis for proportionality. It continued to flourish in
both Europe and America and was consistent with the spread of
the Quaker penitentiaries. People were sentenced to penitentiaries
to be punished; there was nothing "rehabilitative" about them, ex-
cept the repentance that was expected to come from enduring the
punishment.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 71 (T.M. Knox
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1942) (1821).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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The retributionist paradigm lasted thousands of years and did
not come under serious philosophical attack until the early 1800s,
when a group of English utilitarians led by Jeremy Bentham began
to challenge it.-5 For the utilitarians, the only purpose of punish-
ment was to prevent crime, that is, to be a deterrent. 6 Bentham,
and in America, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., saw the pro-
spective criminal as a rational bad man, who weighed the benefits
of his crime against the risks of detection and the costs of punish-
ment. 7 The purpose of punishment under the deterrence model
was simply to make the costs of crime so high that they outweighed
the benefits.
The utilitarians believed that morality has nothing to with pun-
ishment. Bentham argued that if he could be assured that a partic-
ular criminal would never commit another crime, any punishment
of him would be unjust. 59 Richard Posner has argued that aside
55. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT (R. Heward & R. Smith
et al. eds. and trans., 1830).
56. Id.
57. Bentham and Holmes were very much the progenitors of the University of
Chicago-based law and economics movement, which extended these utilitarian princi-
ples to other areas of the law. Ironically, Holmes also spawned the left-wing "critical
legal studies" movement, which is equally devoid of moral principles. See generally
ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK AND LEGACY OF
JUSTICE HOLMES (2000); Morris B. Hoffman, Book Review, 54 STAN. L. REV. 597
(2001). Holmes rejected not only the retributionists but also those utilitarians whose
view of "prevention" included rehabilitation. Holmes's logic, as usual, was compel-
ling: the criminal law will lose all of its deterrent purpose if bad men know they will
be treated rather than punished. Indeed, Holmes's notion of the "bad man" was itself
a rejection of the rehabilitative ideal. At the very least, Holmes argued that rehabili-
tation could never be the only purpose of punishment: ("If it were, every prisoner
should be released as soon as it appears clear that he will never repeat his offence,
and if he is incurable he should not be punished at all.") OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,
JR., THE COMMON LAW 42 (Little, Brown & Co. 1923) (1881). These observations
take on an eerily modern significance when we talk about drug courts as devices for
reverse moral screening. See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
58. HOLMES, supra note 57, at 42-43.
59. BENTHAM, supra note 55, at 41. "If we could consider an offense which has
been committed as an isolated fact, the like of which would never recur, punishment
would be useless. It would only be adding one evil to another." It seems to me that
this conclusion follows only if one takes an unduly narrow view of deterrence. Deter-
rence is not only about discouraging the particular wrongdoer from committing addi-
tional wrongs in the future, but also discouraging other people by example. And, of
course, this second kind of deterrence has the potential to be substantially more effec-
tive, because it acts on the population as a whole, rather than on a single criminal. For
the very same reason, assuming equal rates of success, deterrence is far more efficient
than rehabilitation.
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from the problem of judgment-proof criminals, all criminal sanc-
tions could be replaced with a system of fines.60
Naturally, if punishment is viewed as a utilitarian tool to deter
future illegal behavior of potential criminals, then it can also be
used, though less efficiently, to shape the behavior of the particular
defendant being punished. Not only would punishment deter him
from engaging in future crimes, but it could also change him. The
early beginnings of what became known as the "rehabilitative
ideal" thus started, on their face, as a rather simple extension of
the deterrence model.
But it was hardly a simple extension. It represented a profound
change in the way human behavior was viewed. Criminals were no
longer ordinary people, cursed like all of us with original sin, whose
own humanity demanded that their crimes against moral consensus
be purged with proportionate punishment.61 Rather, they were
morally diseased, quite different from us, and they needed to be
cured.
By the end of World War I, this rehabilitative perspective was
becoming dominant in American penology, and it remained domi-
nant until after World War II. It is probably no coincidence that
the rise and fall of the rehabilitative ideal coincided roughly with
the rise and fall of the welfare state.62 Among the state's increas-
ing New Deal responsibilities toward its citizens was the responsi-
bility to cure all the social ills that were believed to lead to crime,
and to treat criminals whose as-yet unreformed social circum-
stances led them to crime. There was a distinct moral fervor in the
early rehabilitationists, as there is in its current devotees, similar to
the tenor of the temperance movement: There is a right way and a
wrong way to live, and lost souls who choose the path of crime,
whether as a result of social circumstance or not, must be shown
the right way.
The attacks on the rehabilitative ideal came primarily from the
political left, beginning with the jewel of the rehabilitative ideal-
the American juvenile court system. With its progressive origins in
Chicago in 1899, the juvenile court movement was based on the
belief that young offenders were not only ripe for rehabilitation,
and needed a more individualized and sensitive justice system in
60. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 1193, 1203-04 (1985).
61. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., R.A. Duff & David Garland, Introduction: Thinking About Punish-
ment, in A READER ON PUNISHMENT 1, 2-3 (R.A. Duff & D. Garland eds., 1994).
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order to maximize rehabilitative efforts, but also that, unlike adult
criminals, they suffered from the curable sociological disease of
"delinquency. '"63 The function of juvenile courts was not to punish
or to deter, but to cure delinquency. The juvenile court movement
took the nation by storm, not at all unlike today's drug court move-
ment. 64 By 1920-just twenty years after their invention-juvenile
courts were in place in all but three states.
But the sensitive paternalism of the juvenile court movement
had an ugly statist face. Commentators began to write about a sys-
tem in which gentle persuasion was giving way to unchecked judi-
cial powers, and where an abject lack of basic due process "helped
to create a system that subjected more and more juveniles to arbi-
trary and degrading punishments. '66 Even the Supreme Court en-
tered the fray, ruling in 1967 that juvenile defendants are entitled
to the protections of the Sixth Amendment's guaranty of counsel.67
Critics of both the juvenile and adult rehabilitative ideal also be-
gan to express concerns about a governmental regime in which de-
fendants are simultaneously treated and punished. In 1971, the
American Friends Service Committee published a scathing attack
on rehabilitative penology, and included in their criticisms a funda-
mental objection to coerced treatment: "When we punish the per-
son and simultaneou.sly try to treat him, we hurt the individual
more profoundly and more permanently than if we merely im-
63. See generally ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF
DELINQUENCY (2d ed. 1977).
64. There are other striking similarities between the juvenile court movement and
the drug court movement: both were initially led by charismatic judges; both are
based on a fundamental therapeutic paternalism; both have liberal political origins
but are quick to deny they are "soft" on crime; both rely heavily on pseudo-scientific
social principles; both rely on informal proceedings; and both are designed to de-
crease the role of the defense lawyer and increase the activism and discretion of the
judge. NOLAN, JR., supra note 2, at 174 ("[S]o similar are the two forms of therapeu-
tic jurisprudence that one is tempted to view the juvenile courts as the direct historical
antecedent to drug courts."). Nolan also points out significant differences between the
two movements, however, including the fact that juvenile courts relied much less on
the therapeutic community and that juvenile judges were much less active in defend-
ants' day-to-day treatment. Id. at 174-75; See generally Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilita-
tive Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court Movement, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1206,
1269-77 (1998).
65. NOLAN, JR., supra note 2, at 171.
66. PLATT, supra note 63, at 162; see also Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Child-
hood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court,
69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1120 (1991).
67. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 61 (1967).
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prison him for a specific length of time."68 The Quakers' recanta-
tion of the rehabilitative ideal was particularly influential, given
their seminal role in the invention of the American penitentiary.
By 1970, forty years after its ascension, the rehabilitative ideal
was in theoretical and empirical shambles.6 9 Uncoupled to any
concept of proportionality, its primary theoretical failure was that
it gave the state unchecked powers to "cure" that were unrelated
to any notions of criminal responsibility and fundamental justice.
If it takes ten years of prison, or any other form of state-imposed
therapy or re-education, to cure Jean Valjean of shoplifting, then
ten years is what must be imposed. This threat to individual lib-
erty, acceptable to pro-government progressives of the 1930s, was
decidedly unacceptable to a post-World War II, post-Nazi, cold war
generation becoming increasingly wary of state power. As Norval
Morris put it: "[T]he concept of just desert remains an essential
link between crime and punishment. Punishment in excess of what
is seen by that society at that time as a deserved punishment is
tyranny. ' 70 He further stated: "We cage criminals for what they
have done; it is an injustice to cage them also for what they are in
order to change them, to attempt to cure them coercively. "71
The real death knell to the rehabilitative ideal, both in general
and in its juvenile incarnation, came not from the theoreticians but
from the empiricists. Rehabilitation simply did not work. Crime
was mysteriously immune to the entire liberal regimen, from anti-
poverty programs to prison reform.7 After four decades of experi-
mentation, the studies rather dramatically illustrated that all of our
idealistic efforts to rehabilitate had virtually no effect on the pro-
pensity of juveniles or adults to commit crime.73
The fiction that imprisonment, even in its most rehabilitation-
friendly form, has ever been successful in rehabilitating inmates
has come to be called "the noble lie" by some critics.74 David
68. AM. FRIENDS SERVI. COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 147-48 (1971).
69. See generally FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE
IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE (1981).
70. MORRIS, supra note 36, at 76.
71. NOLAN, JR., supra note 2, at 163 (quoting Norval Morris and Gordon Haw-
kins, Letter to the President on Crime Control).
72. Ainsworth, supra note 66, at 1104 ("Despite several decades of experience
with rehabilitative penology in the adult and juvenile systems, however, criminal re-
cidivism stubbornly refused to whither away.")
73. Id. at 1105.
74. E.g., MORRIS, supra note 36, at 20-22 (discussing the "abandonment" of the
reform of criminals as justification for imprisonment).
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Rothman, who coined the term, argued in 1973 that it was long
past time to abandon the noble lie:
The most serious problem is that the concept of rehabilitation
simply legitimates too much. The dangerous uses to which it can
be put are already apparent in several court opinions, particu-
larly those in which the judiciary has approved of indeterminate
sentences . . . . Moreover, it is the rehabilitation concept that
provides a backdrop for the unusual problems we are about to
confront on the issues of chemotherapy and psychosurgery ....
This is not the right time to expand the sanctioning power of
rehabilitation.75
With a swiftness rarely seen in complex institutions, the Ameri-
can penal system dropped rehabilitation almost overnight. What
had, as late as 1972, been described in the criminal law treatises as
the central justification for punishment, 76 was by 1986, being de-
scribed in the past tense.77 This was much more than a theoretical
rejection by academics and textbook writers. Correctional officials
across America were also abandoning rehabilitation in their day-
to-day operations.78
The extraordinarily sudden abandonment of the rehabilitative
ideal gave way to a kind of fusion of retribution and incapacitation,
dubbed by some as "neo-retributionism. '' 79 The modest goals of
punishment as a just dessert, and prevention as the simple act of
taking criminals out of society, replaced rehabilitation as the domi-
nant penal theory.80 These ideas ultimately resulted in the aban-
donment of indeterminate sentencing schemes and eventually to
the controversial Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 1
75. David J. Rothman, Deincarcerating Prisoners and Patients, 1973 C.L. REV. 8,
24 (1973).
76. See, e.g., WAYNE LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW 23 (1972)
(noting that "there has been more of a commitment to the 'rehabilitative ideal' in
recent years than to other theories of punishment").
77. See, e.g., WAYNE LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 28-29 (2d ed.
1986) (discussing the dearth of criticism of rehabilitative theories beginning in the
1960s).
78. See, e.g., Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1011,
1012-13 (1991) (discussing the abrupt rejection of the rehabilitative ideal of
punishment).
79. See, Elizabeth Rapaport, Retribution and Redemption in the Operation of Ex-
ecutive Clemency, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1501, 1502 (2000).
80. See generally MARVIN FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT OR-
DER (1973); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS
(1976); RICHARD G. SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALITY AND
DESERT (1979) .
81. The Guidelines began with Congress's 1984 enactment of the Sentencing Re-
form Act, Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976 (1984) ("the SRA"). The SRA changed
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Almost all modern criminologists acknowledge that each of the
four traditional justifications for punishment-retribution, deter-
rence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation-must continue to play
some role in the criminal justice system. 2 However, integrating
them into a coherent and sensible system has not been easy, in no
small part because they represent incompatible goals.s3 If deter-
rence and incapacitation were the only considerations, then per-
haps all crimes should be punishable by life sentences or death.84
If rehabilitation were the only consideration, then all crime could
be considered forms of social disease, treatable in hospital-like set-
tings, never in prisons.
Only retribution connects the crime with the punishment, treats
criminals as moral beings rather than diseased subjects in a utilita-
rian social experiment, and imposes proportionality limitations on
the government's right to punish. As a result, despite all their
machinations about a synthesis, most modern criminologists have
the century-old federal indeterminate sentencing scheme to a determinate one and
created the U.S. Sentencing Commission, which ultimately created the Guidelines.
WEST GROUP, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 1-2 (1999). One can be a
neo-retributionist without necessarily being a fan of the Guidelines. The SRA and its
Guidelines triggered a whole host of controversies, including constitutional questions
about the separation of powers and institutional questions about the role of judicial
discretion, the resolution of which do not necessarily depend on one's views on retri-
bution. See, e.g., Charles L. Ogeltree, Jr., The Death of Discretion?: Reflections on the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938 (1988) (criticizing the Guide-
lines for failing to address the complex issues involved in sentencing, such as individ-
ual characteristics of the defendant and racial disparity in sentencing); Note, The
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Confrontation Rights, 42 DUKE L.J. 382 (1992) (ad-
vocating that confrontation rights should apply to sentencing under the Guidelines in
order to adequately protect defendants); Note, The Standard of Proof at Sentencing
Hearings Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Why the Preponderance of the Evi-
dence Standard is Constitutionally Inadequate, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 583 (1997). In
1989, the Supreme Court rejected constitutional attacks on the SRA and Guidelines
based on arguments that they were a delegation of excess legislative authority and a
violation of the separation of powers. United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
Commentators have disagreed about whether the Guidelines allow appropriate reha-
bilitative consideration, especially in drug cases. Compare Note, Sentencing the Re-
formed Addict: Departure Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Problem of
Drug Rehabilitation, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 2051 (1991) (describing the disagreement
over the interpretation of the Guidelines as allowing downward departures for reha-
bilitated defendants) with Comment, Downward Departures from the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines Based on the Defendant's Drug Rehabilitative Efforts, 59 U. CHI. L.
REV. 837 (1992) (arguing that defendant's genuine efforts at rehabilitation can be a
valid reason to justify departure from the Guidelines).
82. NOLAN, JR., supra note 2, at 159-64.
83. Id. at 159-64.
84. A situation which, as described in the text accompanying note 38 supra, comes
close to describing most European criminal systems from the Middle Ages through
the Enlightenment.
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found their way back to retribution as the pole star of
punishment.85
In 1979, Francis Allen delivered the Storrs Lecture at Yale Law
School on the topic of the demise of the rehabilitative ideal. That
lecture was published in 1981, and it has become a kind of obituary
for rehabilitation. 86 Allen impressively documented both the theo-
retical and empirical failings of rehabilitation. He concluded his
lectures with this prediction:
[A]ttitudes toward [the rehabilitative ideal] are likely to be wary
in the closing years of this century. A statement made by Lionel
Trilling over a generation ago still possesses acute relevance to
the present: "Some paradox of our nature leads us, when once
we have made our fellow men the object of our enlightened in-
terest, to go on to make them the objects of our pity, then our
wisdom, ultimately our coercion. ... " Given the history through
which American society has recently passed, it is hardly possible
that the total benevolence of governmental interventions into
persons' lives will be unthinkingly assumed .... It is just as
well. For modern citizens of the world have learned that the
interests of individuals and society are frequently adverse and
that the assumption of their identity supplies the predicate for
despotism.87
Sadly, Professor Allen's prediction could not have been more
wrong. Less than ten years after rehabilitation's obituary, the gurus
of rehabilitation were back, this time with a vengeance, fueled by a
zeal to treat the psychiatrically less fortunate, and in particular to
win the war on drugs. These neo-rehabilitationists are pushing
judges into unprecedented extremes that Professor Allen could not
have imagined. In the flash of an eye judges have become intru-
sive, coercive, and unqualified state psychiatrists and behavioral
policemen, charged with curing all manner of social and quasi-so-
cial diseases, from truancy to domestic violence to drug use. By
forgetting the most profound lesson of the twentieth century-that
the state can be a dangerous repository of collective evil-thera-
85.'For example, the utilitarian J.J.C. Smart argues that although deterrence
should be the prime consideration of legislators (what he calls "second order" ques-
tions), judges should be concerned primarily with retribution (what he calls "first or-
der" questions). J.J.C. Smart, Comment: The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment 6
RES JUDICATAE 368 (June 1953). Even Norval Morris, who is associated more with
incapacitation than retribution, acknowledges that retribution must play a central role
in linking the punishment with the crime. NOLAN, JR., supra note 2, at 163.
86. ALLEN, supra note 69.
87. Id. at 86-87.
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peutic jurisprudence poses a serious risk to the kind of individual-
ism and libertarianism upon which our republic was founded.
III. THE THEORY BEHIND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
Although therapeutic jurisprudence descends directly from the
long-rejected rehabilitative ideal, its proponents rarely talk about
its theoretical heritage. The movement is almost devoid of any-
thing resembling serious theoretical self-examination. The ques-
tions that have plagued philosophers and criminologists for a
thousand years, and whose answers have come to define all major
schools of criminology, are questions therapeutic jurisprudence
devotees seldom ask.18 But the movement does have a short his-
tory, if not a terribly satisfying theoretical one.
It owes its beginnings to mental health law, where, by definition,
the current and prospective mental states of the participants are
the primary inquiry. Its initial insights were neither terribly
profound nor particularly original: in a system whose very function
is to judge the mental state of its subjects, we should think about
the mental health effects of the actions we as judges take. Thus, for
example, when we remand a criminal defendant for a competency
evaluation, we should think about the effects the remand and eval-
uation might have on the defendant's competence.
These initial formulations about a therapeutic judicial perspec-
tive were limited in several important respects. First, they were
focused on empirical questions: what effects are our rulings having
on the mental health of the chronically mentally ill, insane or in-
competent? Proponents, at least initially, never suggested that we
should begin to change our rulings or the way we make them in
anticipation of effects before we measure what those effects might
actually be.
More importantly, these therapeutic ideas were originally pro-
posed exclusively for application to mental health law, where the
state has already crossed that thorny boundary of paternalism and
already has its hands uncomfortably inside the heads of the unfor-
tunate participants. Of course, many aspects of mental health law
involve the judiciary's positive obligation to ensure treatment of
the mental conditions of the people appearing in court as a precon-
88. The one exception I found was an article about restorative justice written by
an Australian social scientist, John Braithewaite. Braithewaite, supra note 1. Profes-
sor Braithewaite not only tackles the difficult traditional philosophical and crimino-
logical issues underlying punishment, he also attempts to summarize the data behind
the claims and criticisms of the model.
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dition to moving into its more traditional truth-finding role. By
expanding the therapeutic model into nonmental health areas, the
therapeutic jurisprudence movement not only intrudes without any
basis for intrusion, it profoundly changes the judicial function. Tri-
als are no longer processes to investigate factual guilt and discover
truth, they are mere opportunities to treat.
This therapeutic perspective is completely inimical to the judicial
function. We should conduct trials guided by the rules of proce-
dure and evidence that have been crafted over centuries to maxi-
mize the reliability of the result, not to ensure that the litigants
have a meaningful mental health experience. We should impose
sentences and assess damages guided by well-settled principles of
responsibility, not by fretting about whose feelings will be hurt or
how the community can be healed.
The profound and dangerous expansion of the judicial role rep-
resented by the therapeutic jurisprudence movement is just a small
part of a broad therapeutic trend in all aspects of government and
indeed across the entire spectrum of our culture. James Nolan has
labeled this trend "the therapeutic ethos."89 Government's new
role is to treat, not to enforce norms. Its success is measured by
how it makes us feel, not by what it actually does. And because the
couch of State needs patients, citizens are no longer individual par-
ticipants in a free republic, but sets of victims with complicated dis-
eases in dire need of state-sponsored treatment.
In this "postmodern moral order," as Nolan calls it, suffering is
no longer viewed as a part of the human condition, but rather as
the inevitable consequence of some disease or injury. Almost all of
human behavior has become pathologized. We speak of "addic-
tions" to all manner of behaviors that we would have called
"choices" just thirty years ago. 90 Today, cancer and alcoholism are
both "diseases"; heroin use now shares an addictive moral equiva-
lence with things like gambling and eating chocolate. Of course,
this externalization of behavior is just a new version of our old
friend defilement: once we blamed phantom gods for our suffer-
ing;91 now we blame phantom diseases. 92
In the particular context of drug courts, James Nolan has called
this process of pathologization the "eradication of guilt":
89. NOLAN, JR., supra note 25, at 17-21.
90. See, e.g., STANTON PEELE, THE DISEASING OF AMERICA: ADDICTION TREAT-
MENT OUT OF CONTROL (1989).
91. See generally supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
92. See generally supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
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The drug court's eradication of guilt has been a subtle and insid-
ious process. Guilt is not so much challenged as ignored. It is
not so much disputed as it is made irrelevant. But it is the mak-
ing irrelevant of something that has long been regarded as the
crux of criminal justice .... The jettisoning of guilt may well
represent the most important, albeit rarely reflected upon, con-
sequence of the drug court. If, as Philip Rieff argued, culture is
not possible without guilt, one wonders what will become of a
criminal justice system bereft of what was once its defining
quality.93
Blaming the pathogens has become the raison d'etre for the judi-
cial system, both in criminal and civil cases. An African man who
murders his wife blames his anti-divorce culture;94 a fired employee
blames "chronic lateness syndrome."95 Of course, the judiciary
takes its cases as it finds them, and judges cannot be blamed en-
tirely for acting like psychiatrists when the parties insist on it. But
the therapeutic jurisprudence movement requires us to act like psy-
chiatrists even when no litigant is insisting on it, and indeed even
when all the litigants object (that is, they are in "denial"). It is this
aspect of mandated judicial intrusion that makes therapeutic juris-
prudence so dangerous and so utterly unacceptable in our constitu-
tional scheme.
IV. THE MOST DANGEROUS BRANCH
The judicial branch was specifically designed to be the least dan-
gerous of the three branches. Hamilton coined that famous phrase
in this classic description of the circumscribed powers of the fed-
eral judiciary:
[T]he judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be
the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution;
because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them....
The judiciary ... has no influence over either the sword or the
purse; no direction either of the strength or wealth of the soci-
ety; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be
said to have neither FORCE NOR WILL, but merely judgment;
and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm
even for the efficacy of its judgments.96
93. NOLAN, JR., supra note 2, at 142-43.
94. Margot Slade, At the Bar, N. Y. TIMES, May 20, 1994, at B20.
95. Sch. Dist. of Phila. v. Friedman, 96 PA. COMMW. 267, 270 (1986).
96. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 490 (Alexander Hamilton) (B. Wright ed., 1996).
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Federal judges are not elected, but appointed for life, helping to
decrease the chances they will be influenced either by corrupt
forces or, often more subtly, the vagaries of popular will.97 The
case or controversy requirement helps decrease the chances that
judges will make abstract law (that is, policy) in the guise of decid-
ing a case.98 The very architecture of the federal and state systems
leaves the judicial branches without the power either to make or
enforce laws and further dissipates federal judicial power by im-
bedding it in a system in which individual states continue to oper-
ate in their own spheres of sovereignty.
One might ask why the founders were so keen on such a compre-
hensive institutional clipping of the judiciary's powers. The answer
is that they appreciated, from their own English history, that un-
checked judicial power is an evil to avoid at almost any cost. Both
the Federalists and the anti-Federalists were acutely aware of the
failings of the English system, in which all judges were appointed
by the Crown and served at the Crown's pleasure, and in which
Parliament was invested with supreme appellate jurisdiction in all
cases.
99
The founders were even more acutely aware of the failings of the
Confederation, under which there was no federal judiciary at all. 100
Hamilton wrote extensively about the need for an independent ju-
diciary to house judges capable of defending the new federal Con-
stitution against incursions by the other two branches. 1 '
Madison's expositions on the separation of powers doctrine were
designed to allay the fears of the anti-Federalists that the existing
constitutional plan did not do enough to separate the three
branches. 02
97. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
98. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
99. In The Federalist No. 47, which was Madison's first exposition on the separa-
tion of powers, he discusses at length the entangled failings of the British judiciary,
and even quotes Montesquieu's criticisms:
"Were the power of the judging joined with the legislative, the life and lib-
erty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge
would then be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the
judge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor."
THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 338 (James Madison) (B. Wright ed, 1996).
100. "A circumstance which crowns the defects of the Confederation remains yet to
be mentioned-the want of a judiciary power. Laws are a dead letter without courts
to expound and define their true meaning and operation." Id. at 187.
101. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 489-96 (Alexander Hamilton) (B. Wright ed.,
1996).
102. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 84 (James Madison) (B. Wright ed., 1996).
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Our commitment to judicial restraint is not limited to the consti-
tutional design. The mootness'0 3 and ripeness.. 4 doctrines give
meaning to the case or controversy requirement, and help insure
that decisions by judges will be a recourse of last resort. Indeed,
the whole paradigm of the common law is built around the notion
that precisely because judges have extraordinary powers in single
cases-the power to incarcerate and the power to bankrupt-those
powers must be limited to single cases and will operate beyond sin-
gle cases only after surviving the judgment of judicial history.1 0 5
Along with these structural limitations, judges have developed a
powerful ethos of restraint. Although some might say the ring of
that ethos has become rather hollow in the years following the New
Deal and Warren Courts, the restraining rules have for the most
part remained quite vigorous, especially in trial courts. Deference
to appellate court precedent effectively constrains even the most
independent-minded trial judge, as it does the appellate courts
themselves, though of course to a lesser degree. At all levels, we
are loath to decide issues we need not decide, are generally com-
mitted to deciding cases on the narrowest grounds, and will almost
always follow controlling precedent.
All of these constitutional, common law, and normative princi-
ples have blended together to create a profound commitment to
restraint in responsible judges. We are unrepresentative, mostly
unelected, independent magistrates whose function is to decide no
more than the necessary issues in the single cases thrust upon us, in
accordance with laws and established rules of evidence and proce-
dure with which we may or may not agree. Juries tell us the facts,
appellate courts may tell us we were wrong on the law, and legisla-
tures may avoid most effects of our decisions by changing the laws.
We have no more valid insight into public policy than the members
of any other particular occupation."°6
103. See, e.g., Three Affiliated Tribes of Ft. Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g,
467 U.S. 138, 157 (1984) ("It is a fundamental rule of judicial restraint ... that this
Court will not reach constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding
them.").
104. Id.
105. See generally OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 33-37
(Harvard Univ. Press 1923) (1881).
106. Holmes is perhaps more responsible than anyone for breathing life back into
the founders' commitment to judicial restraint. He wrote powerfully and elegantly
about the need for judges to judge rather than legislate, and his commitment to that
principle was all the more impressive because he personally disagreed with so much of
what the progressive Congress was trying to do in the 1920s and 1930s. In fact, he
suggested that his epitaph be "Here lies the supple tool of power." ALSCHULER, supra
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Yet it seems to be an occupational hazard for judges and other
members of the public to confuse our simple role as gatekeepers of
the truth-finding function with anything at all having to do with the
will of the governed. We do not make public policy; we do not
even enforce it. We are, as Madison put it, only the "remote choice
of the people. ' 10 7 That very remoteness is what both prevents us
from becoming, and tempts us to become, the most dangerous of
the three branches.
The therapeutic jurisprudence movement requires us to become
the kind of involved, hands-on, right-thinking, sure-footed activists
that the judicial branch was specifically designed to exclude. It re-
quires us to accept, in a collective fashion entirely inconsistent with
the fierce independence of the judiciary, a therapeutic paradigm
that is not only a matter of public policy, but about which reasona-
ble public policy makers differ. It is forcing us to collaborate with
prosecutors, defense lawyers, and therapists in a fashion that is en-
tirely inconsistent with our adjudicative role. In its most virulent
drug court form it requires us to send people to prison not because
they violated the law (since the real engine of drug courts is the
unstated belief that possession should not be a crime), but rather
because they resisted our enlightened treatment efforts. In short,
therapeutic jurisprudence is a code phrase for a kind of one-stop-
shopping system populated by judges who believe that they have
such powerful insights into public policy (insights that have appar-
ently escaped mere legislators) that they cheerfully act as parents,
best friends, doctors, psychotherapists, prosecutors, defense law-
yers, legislators and then, only if all of that fails, judges. I cannot
imagine a more dangerous, or sanctimonious, branch.
A. Real Judges as Amateur Psychiatrists: Acts Versus Excuses
and the Paradox of Reverse Moral Screening
One the most disturbing consequences of the therapeutic juris-
prudence movement is that while therapeutic judges get to play
amateur psychiatrist, in the end the command of the law requires
them to punish the patients they cannot cure. Imagine going to see
a doctor about a disease, knowing that the doctor might not only
be unable to cure you, but will be required to send you to prison if
you are not cured. Now imagine a whole system of justice based
note 57, at 82. He also wrote that "[I]f my fellow citizens want to go to Hell I will help
them. It's my job." Id. (quoting Letter from Holmes to Harold Laski (March 4,
1920)).
107. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 281 (James Madison) (B. Wright ed., 1996).
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on that notion, and you will have captured the essence of therapeu-
tic jurisprudence.
State-coerced treatment does not work,' 0 8 and even if it did, it is
simply immoral for the state to treat and then punish acts it claims
have a disease component, as the critics of the rehabilitative ideal
demonstrated thirty years ago. 1°9 The "diseases" to be treated are
not diseasesat all, but rather complex behaviors that fall within a
broad continuum between "voluntary" and "involuntary" behav-
iors. If we really believed that all human behavior is the product of
the relentless and involuntary spasm of genes and experience, and
that free will is a quaint mirage, then the state would have no
moral right to punish anyone for any crime. The disease of
"chronic armed robbery syndrome" would merit no more punish-
ment than cancer. But of course we don't believe that.
The very existence of law is a reflection of deep-seated and
shared notions of free will and individual responsibility. That is not
to say, of course, that the retribution demanded of crimes cannot
take into consideration all of the specific circumstances of the
crime, including the criminal's complete background. Indeed, we
must take all those circumstances into consideration to fulfill the
requirement that retribution be proportional, and therefore just.
But it is one thing to say we will consider an armed robber's I.Q.
and childhood in crafting the amount of retribution, and quite an-
other thing to say that the disease of chronic armed robbery syn-
drome should be treated rather than punished. Therapeutic
jurisprudence blurs, and is intended to blur, this fundamental
moral distinction between act and excuse.
Even if treatment worked, and could be justly combined with
punishment, the therapeutic paradigm punishes the wrong people.
For example, if drug addiction really is a disease, then the most
diseased addicts are precisely the ones most likely to fail many, if
not all, attempts at treatment. Drug courts are thus performing a
kind of "reverse moral screening."' 110 Truly diseased addicts end up
going to prison, while those who respond well to treatment, and
whose use of drugs may thus have been purely voluntary, escape
punishment.
108. See supra notes 24-30, 72-73 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 64-66, 69 and accompanying text.
110. Hoffman, supra note 8, at 1476.
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B. Judicial Collectivism
Therapeutic judges not only act ineffectively and immorally as
amateur psychiatrists, they also act in a dangerous collective,
wholly inconsistent with fundamental axioms of judicial indepen-
dence. They act in concert with, and therefore abrogate their inde-
pendence to, each other, their "communities," prosecutors, defense
lawyers, and therapists.
One of the starkest examples of the kind of group action that
dominates the therapeutic model can be found in the intense politi-
cal machinations undertaken to create and sustain drug courts.
Unlike other legal reform movements, that began with a handful of
individual decisions, commentaries, or experiments, and then
spread through the power of their own persuasion, the drug court
movement has a decidedly top-down pedigree. Though they began
as a single experiment in Miami, drug courts spread because of
centralized federal funding, not because they were effective. Drug
courts exhibit a remarkable uniformity because they must now
meet a host of specific federal criteria in order to qualify for fed-
eral funds."' What once was an opportunity for state and local
governments to experiment with drug court reforms has, to a great
extent, turned into a lockstep ersatz federal program.
Drug court workshops across the country are "heavily scripted
and staged events," designed to give drug court officials an oppor-
tunity to "strategize with each other and educate those new to the
scene about how best to present the program to sometimes skepti-
cal audiences for the purpose of garnering public support and fi-
nancial resources to further the movement."' 12 There is a five-part
liturgy to the drug court movement's rigid political doctrine: 1)
convince prosecutors that drug courts are not soft on crime; 2) start
off with only low-level drug offenses while building public support;
3) cultivate relationships with the media; 4) hold graduation cere-
monies in open court as public relations events; and 5) constantly
perform evaluation studies to justify continued funding. 113 This is
mindless public relations mantra, not creative judicial reform by
independent-minded judges.
When the federal funds run out, as they inevitably seem to do,
drug court judges then participate in lobbying legislatures, city
councils, and even the private sector for funding. Their partisan
111. Id. at 1528-29.
112. NOLAN, JR., supra note 2, at 62.
113. Id. at 62-65.
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enthusiasm crosses even the most forgiving boundaries of judicial
propriety. A Las Vegas, Nevada drug court judge set up his own
tax-exempt nonprofit organization through which to solicit private
funds for his drug court. 14 A Rochester, New York drug court
judge used the local United Way to dispense the private funds he
raised for his drug court." 5 A 1997 Justice Department survey
showed that nine drug courts had solicited a total of nearly half a
million dollars from private sources.' 1 6 Therapeutic jursisprudence
is turning some of us into embarrassing hucksters.
The development of so-called "community-based courts" is an-
other example of judicial collectivism at its worst. Modeled after
New York City's Midtown Community Court, these courts have
been started in many urban areas to deal with what proponents call
"quality of life crimes. '117 Generally, defendants convicted of
crimes such as shoplifting, prostitution, and some low-level drug
offenses are "treated" by being put on probation or given deferred
sentences and by performing certain community service obliga-
tions. Typically, the precise community service obligations are de-
termined in each individual case not by the judge but by a
"community advisory board" consisting of various community
leaders. 118 This way, the criminals are not only cured of their rude
behaviors by having to do the penance of community service, but
the criminal tear in the fabric of the community is also healed. Two
therapies for the price of one.
The community service options can be rather interesting. They
include not only what one might expect from traditional commu-
nity service, such as clean-up activities like graffiti removal and
trash pickup, but also "stuffing envelopes for non-profit organiza-
tions." 19 Through community courts, judges abdicate their sen-
114. Id. at 97.
115. Id. The judge explains his funding activities this way:
Whether you like it or not you as the judge are considered a leader of your
drug court team. Your team looks to you for inspiration and guidance. So as
a leader of that team you must take a very active part in the raising of funds.
For the Rochester court, I went out and raised all the money from local
foundations.
116. CAROLINE COOPER ET AL., DRUG COURT RES. CTR., DRUG COURTS: 1997
OVERVIEW OF OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 120-
27 (1997).
117. See, e.g., Judith S. Kaye, Rethinking Traditional Approaches, 62 ALB. L. REV.
1491, 1494 (1999).
118. Id.
119. Id.
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tencing authority to self-described community leaders and their pet
projects, including their favorite charities.
In addition to the usual therapeutic misanthropy inherent in all
therapeutic courts, community-based courts raise particularly dis-
turbing problems about the role of judges and their place in the
political firmament. Why are some crimes labeled "quality of life
crimes" and others not? Surely a murder effects the "quality of
life" of the victim, witnesses, and other members of the community
more than shoplifting does. Why does the torn fabric of the com-
munity need to be repaired after a shoplifting, but not after a mur-
der? The answer, of course, is not that the former is any more
damaging than the latter, but rather that the former is more wide-
spread than the latter. It is this widespread nature of "quality of
life crimes" that makes community-based courts so politically at-
tractive. They generate an army of involuntary servants to do free
work pleasing to a maximum of community voters. Fundamen-
tally, community-based courts are machines of political payoff,
dressed in the garb of the judiciary. 120
The most widespread, and in many ways, most disturbing, form
of judicial collectivism occurs in all therapeutic courts, and is em-
bodied in the very term "therapeutic jurisprudence"-the unholy
and wholly unconstitutional washing out of the judge's role in an
adversary system. All therapeutic courts presume factual guilt.
What is called "the presumption of innocence" in traditional courts
is called "denial" in therapeutic courts. The judge, prosecutor,
therapist, and to a great extent, even the defense lawyer, 2 ' join
120. Perhaps the most troubling thing about community-based courts is that their
proponents are seriously proposing that they be extended from petty crimes to the
entire justice system. Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals
has suggested just such an unbounded extension. "What about a community court for
civil cases? For commercial cases? For family cases? For youth crime? .... [T]hese are
very very good questions, well worth considering." Id. at 1494. With all due respect to
Chief Judge Kaye, what is a community-based commercial court? Would Chief Judge
Kaye have panels of community activists decide whether defaulting borrowers should
clean subways instead of repay their bank loans? Should negligent surgeons have to
lick and stuff envelopes for the American Trial Lawyers Association instead of paying
damages to their victims? In the end, if the rights that flow to individuals-from their
contracts, from common law, from statute or from the constitution-are nothing but
the shadows of communal judgment, and if individuals' opportunities to enforce those
rights in courts of law are replaced entirely by a system in which those rights mean
nothing but a certain level of symbolic community opprobrium, then we might as well
disband the judiciary. Indeed, our modern world has already experienced a most ad-
vanced form of such unbounded community courts-the People's Courts in China
during the cultural revolution.
121. For a discussion of the ethical dilemmas drug courts impose on criminal de-
fense lawyers, see Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treat-
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together to "help" the patient over his or her denial in order to
concentrate on treatment.1 22 As a result, the judge, prosecutor,
therapist, and defense lawyer thus form a kind of "treatment
team," designed to do what is best for the reluctant patient, not to
discover truth in the fires of advocacy.
This joining together is so critical that it is common advice to
anyone contemplating the development of a drug court that it will
not work without the "cooperation" of judges, prosecutors, police,
sheriffs, and public defenders. When judges "cooperate" in the
formation of drug courts, what is really happening is that they are
agreeing to abandon their roles as neutral gatekeepers of the truth-
finding process, and instead to join the therapeutic team for the
good of the diseased defendants.
In many drug courts, the team participates in daily rituals euphe-
mistically called "staffing sessions. "123 At these staffing sessions,
the judge, prosecutor, public defender, and some representative of
the therapeutic community, but typically not private defense coun-
sel, meet together in chambers to discuss that day's upcoming mat-
ters. The judge, after hearing from everyone, reaches presumptive
decisions. Defendants are not present and the staffing sessions are
not on the record. Apart from the obvious constitutional con-
cerns,124 these staffing sessions symbolize what is wrong with hav-
ing judges join with prosecutors, defense lawyers, and therapists:
substantive decisions are being made about a felony defendant by
ment Court Movement, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1205 (1999); Developments in the Law-
Alternatives to Incarceration for Drug-Abusing Offenders, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1863
(1998). Professor Boldt summarized the problem this way:
[D]efense counsel [in the drug court] is no longer primarily responsible for
giving voice to the distinct perspective of the defendant's experience in what
remains a coercive setting. Rather, defense counsel becomes part of a treat-
ment team working with others to insure that outcomes, viewed from the
perspective of the institutional players and not the individual defendant, are
in the defendant's best interests.
Bolt, supra, at 1245.
122. Indeed, treatment is imposed as a blanket condition of bail in many drug
courts, despite the potential constitutional problems with such a non-particularized
approach. See Hoffman, supra note 8, at 1462 n.7; cf United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739, 751-52 (1987) (upholding the constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act of
1984 because it required a particularized showing of governmental need); see also
Richard B. Abell, Pretrial Drug Testing: Expanding Rights and Protecting Public
Safety, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 943, 956 (1989) (arguing that pre-trial drug testing is
constitutional).
123. See Hoffman, supra note 8, at 1524.
124. Criminal defendants, even those labeled as the system's "clients," have a Sixth
Amendment right to counsel and to be present at all critical stages of a criminal pros-
ecution. E.g. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-72 (1932).
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some inter-branch committee acting more like a support group
than a court of law.
Judges are not psychiatrists, and psychiatrists are not judges.
Whenever judges enter the therapeutic arena we must choose be-
tween two unpalatable options: either act beyond our expertise or
abdicate our judging to therapeutic experts. Most therapeutic
courts are designed to do the latter. Although therapeutic judges
typically put on a counseling show in open court, 25 the real thera-
peutic decisions are often made out of court by members of the
therapeutic community. 126 This unelected and unaccountable "new
priestly class," as James Nolan describes it, 2 7 has destroyed what
small vestige of independence therapeutic judges may have left af-
ter already doling out large chunks of it to one another, to prosecu-
tors, and to defense lawyers. Judges may be comforted by
pretending to function as a therapeutic team acting in the best in-
terests of defendants, but what is really happening is that they have
abdicated the judging role to the new therapeutic priests.
There may be an argument for sacrificing some judicial indepen-
dence in minor cases to achieve significant therapeutic results, and
indeed judges have been trying to do just that for a long time with
things like safe driving classes and anger management programs.1 28
It may not be terribly troubling to expand these ideas to misde-
meanor shoplifting, graffiti offenses, littering, and other kinds of
minor offenses with which most community-based courts deal. But
applying them to felony drug charges that can result in a defendant
going to prison for decades should be wholly unacceptable. If we
are going to continue to treat drug use as a crime, and some drug
use as a felony, then we must treat felony drug cases seriously, not
like parking tickets in a mill in which the judge, prosecutor, defense
lawyer, and therapist spend their days trying to push as many peo-
ple through as possible.
C. Impinging on the Executive Function
Besides violating the doctrine of the separation of powers by
forcing judges and prosecutors to work on treatment teams to-
gether, the therapeutic jurisprudence movement impinges on the
executive function in two more direct and discrete ways-by de-
125. See supra notes 2-14 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 121-123 and accompanying text.
127. NOLAN, JR., supra note 25, at 7-9.
128. Even for these kinds of long-established programs, there is virtually no evi-
dence of their efficacy.
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molishing prosecutorial discretion and by interfering with
corrections.
It is the long-established privilege of prosecutors to decide what
crimes to charge and what plea bargains to offer.129 Therapeutic
courts, especially drug courts, substantially eliminate both of these
jealously-guarded areas of prosecutorial discretion.
Before drug courts, prosecutors retained their broad discretion
to charge or not charge small possession drug cases, and indeed the
realities of our system drove many prosecutors, and even police, to
ignore some low-level drug possession and even some drug dealing.
But in the postmodern therapeutic world, drug offenders are not
wrongdoers whose transgressions might be overlooked if they are
sufficiently minor, but rather diseased citizens in need of treat-
ment. Thus, we see massive increases in drug filings after the insti-
tution of drug courts,'130 and those explosions correspond directly
to police and prosecutors agreeing at the front end to arrest and
prosecute every drug offender, regardless of circumstance, in order
to meet the therapeutic demand for reluctant patients.
At the plea-bargaining end, prosecutors have likewise abdicated
their traditional discretion. Most drug courts recognize only a few
different kinds of cookie cutter plea bargains, and the decision to
offer a particular plea bargain is driven entirely by a few objective
criteria, and not by the exercise of any meaningful prosecutorial
discretion.' 3 ' After all, this is treatment, not adjudication; triage,
not prosecutorial discretion.
Therapeutic courts also impinge on the executive's corrections
functions. Providing medical treatment to persons convicted of
crimes, and even to persons in custody awaiting trial, is an execu-
129. Prosecutorial charging and bargaining discretion is a fundamental principle in-
herent in the doctrine of separation of powers. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470
U.S. 598, 607 (1985).
This broad discretion [afforded the prosecution] rests largely on the recogni-
tion that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review.
Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence
value, the Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship
to the Government's overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to
the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake.
Id.
130. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
131. In Denver, for example, the dispositional algorithm for defendants charged
with simple possession is fairly rigid: (1) if the defendant has two or more prior felo-
nies, he or she is ineligible for drug court; (2) if the defendant is arrested with a small,
so-called "personal use," amount of drugs, he or she is offered a deferred judgment;
(3) if the defendant is arrested with more than a personal use amount, he or she gets
probation. See also Hoffman, supra note 8, at 1513 nn.297-98.
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tive function, not a judicial one. When therapeutic courts mechani-
cally impose treatment conditions on all defendants, both before
and after conviction, they blur the fundamental distinction between
the accused and the convicted, and therefore between the judicial
function of determining guilt and the executive function of carrying
out sentences and treating prisoners.
It is entirely inappropriate and inimical to our adjudicative role
for judges to be deciding whether defendants have been cured of
their diseases and whether for that reason no punishment should
be imposed. Criminal courts exist to determine whether the state
has met its burden of proving that the defendant has committed a
crime, and if so, to mete out appropriate and just punishment. The
product of a criminal case should be a verdict and a sentence, not a
decision whether John Smith should be treated at Acme House or
Metropolis Hospital, or whether he truly suffers from borderline
personality disorder or is just a jerk.
If we are really serious about treatment, we should direct our
treatment resources to the executive branch's corrections facilities,
both pre-conviction (jails) and post-conviction (jails and prisons).
That is where the push for treatment, voluntary and semi-volun-
tary, belongs if it belongs anywhere. If we continue to believe that
possession of some drugs is serious enough to warrant incarcera-
tion, then we should impose that incarceration without further
therapeutic hand-wringing. Prisoners can then take advantage, or
not take advantage, of intense in-custody drug treatment programs
tied to parole eligibility.
D. Judges as Legislators
The therapeutic jurisprudence movement not only forces judges
to act in concert with each other, with their "communities," with
prosecutors, with defense lawyers, and with therapists, but it also
profoundly subsumes the legislative function. By assuming all
manner of human behavior is the product of some set of sociologi-
cal pathogens, therapeutic courts ignore the principles of free will
and individual responsibility upon which the criminal law rests.
That is, it is for legislatures, and not self-described therapeutic
judges, to decide not only whether certain behavior is a crime or a
disease, but also in many circumstances to set a range of punish-
ment. On these matters, the legislatures have spoken. We no
longer punish adultery, but we do punish the possession of certain
drugs. We no longer execute petty thieves, but shoplifting is still a
crime.
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In many respects, the therapeutic jurisprudence movement, es-
pecially its embodiment in drug courts, is simply a judicial reaction
to laws some judges do not like. Some judges do not believe cer-
tain crimes should be punished by incarceration, and in fact do not
think certain crimes should be considered crimes at all. Thus,
crimes become diseases, defendants become patients, judges be-
come therapists, and laws are repealed by therapeutic judicial fiat.
There may be good arguments for and against decriminalizing
some existing crimes, including some drug crimes, but in the end
that debate must be settled by elected legislatures and not by
judges who think they have some special insight into either
medicine or public policy.
CONCLUSION
The therapeutic jurisprudence movement is not being driven by
evil judges thrilled at the prospect of exerting unwarranted and un-
precedented control over the private lives of fellow citizens, or
even entirely by naive judges suckered into the therapeutic new-
speak. Instead, the therapeutic road we are running down has
been paved with the good intentions of judges reacting to the flood
of dysfunction we see every day in our courtrooms, hardened with
a dash of the kind of judicial hubris that positions us to think that
because we control our courtrooms we can control the lives of eve-
ryone who appears in them. The unprecedented and unwarranted
powers assumed by judges in the name of doing psychological good
will make us both profoundly dangerous in our own right and
hopelessly incapable of protecting citizens from the therapeutic ex-
cesses of the other two branches, just as it did when we tried the
more general rehabilitative experiment in the 1930s.
The next time a group of "problem solving" activists tries to set
up one of these intrusive courts in your community, remember
what the Quakers tried to teach us about the dangers of mixing
well-intentioned rehabilitation with well-deserved punishment.
Remember that we have met failure in a similar fashion in the past.
When we tried to treat crime as if it were a disease, and criminals
as if they were moral in-patients, the only thing we accomplished
was to create a dangerous judiciary that felt authorized to exert
power over these diseased patients for as long as it took to cure
them. If we repeat these rehabilitative failures, we will continue to
de-humanize the objects of our humanitarianism, to fill our penal
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system with our therapeutic failures, to short-circuit what should
be the real legislative debate, and to devalue punishment as its own
clear social object.
